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CRIMINAL LAW
INFORMATIONAL PARADOX AND THE PRICING OF CRIME: CAPITAL
SENTENCING STANDARDS IN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
RICHARD P. ADELSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
The criminal sentencing process involves two
essential considerations: the abstract nature of the
crime and the individualized circumstances in
which the crime occurs. The process of individual-
izing a sentence to reflect a particular criminal
transaction requires sentencing authorities to ex-
ercise substantial discretion. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized the problems in-
volved in permitting trial courts enough discretion
in sentencing to properly consider the individual
circumstances of a crime! without sanctioning an
arbitrary or capricious exercise of the sentencing
power.
In Moore v. Missouri,2 for example, the Court
considered a challenge to the practice of giving less
severe sentences to first offenders than to those with
a history of prior convictions in cases where statu-
torily identical criminal acts were involved. In
upholding this practice, the Court read the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution
to require "that no different degree or higher pun-
ishment shall be imposed on one than is imposed
on all for like offenses," but found no constitutional
bar to "different punishment for the same offense
... under particular circumstances, provided that
it is dealt out to all alike who are similarly situ-
ated."3
This article focuses on a recent manifestation of
the constitutional limitations on sentencing, a series
of difficult cases involving the constitutionality of
the death penalty and the procedures under which
it is imposed. In these capital punishment cases,
McGautha v. California,4 Furman v. Georgia,5 and the
* Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Wes-
leyan University; 1975, J.D.; Ph.D. University of Penn-
sylvania; M.A.T., 1969, Harvard University; S.B., 1968,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
1 See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-49
(1949); Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).
2 150 U.S. 673 (1895).
3 Id. at 678. See also Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.S. 462, 468
(1891); Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1880).
4402 U.S. 183 (1971).
5 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
set of five decisions announced simultaneously in
the summer of 1976,6 the Court considered the
constitutionality of statutes that permit trial courts
to exercise discretion in imposing the death pen-
alty. Each case involved a balance between legis-
lative and judicial determinations of when to apply
the death penalty. The cases thus posed the ques-
tion: "What degree of individualization of sentenc-
ing do the due process clause and the eighth
amendment permit trial courts to exercise?"
The constitutional right to due process and the
eighth amendment's protection against cruel and
unusual punishment are inherently subjective con-
cepts that can be difficult to apply in specific
situations.7 This article will argue that an economic
analysis of sentencing procedures can demonstrate
a more logical basis for analyzing these issues in
capital cases. The economic analysis will substan-
tially clarify the normative issues involved in indi-
vidualized sentencing and, in fact, will reveal a
rationale that closely corresponds to the results and
reasoning actually used by the Court.8 Moreover,
this economic analysis will point out a central
6 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
7 Legal scholars have generally treated the problem as
one of realizing the related ideals of horizontal equity
(treating equals equally) and vertical equity (punishing
more serious offenses more severely)- See, e.g., M. FRAN-
KEL, CRIMINAL SENENCES: LAw WrrHoTrr ORDER (1973);
Coffee, The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues
in the Individualization of Justice, 73 MICH. L. REv. 1361
(1975); Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the
Punishment Fit the Crime, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (1974);
Diamond & Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence
Disparity and Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. Rav. 109 (1975);
Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting Increased
Sentences for Habitual or Dangerous Criminals, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 356 (1975).
'This melding of economic and equitable concerns in
constitutional adjudication involving the criminal process
is not limited to this line of cases. For a similar analysis
of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), and
other cases dealing with negotiated guilty pleas, see Adel-
stein, The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework for Analysis,
53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 783 (1978).
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problem in the sentencing procedure: the difficulty
in gathering and disseminating information on the
consequences of committing a crime.
This approach to constitutional analysis requires
a fresh perspective on the economics of legal insti-
tutions in general. The criminal justice system can
be viewed as a mechanism designed to exact the
"price" of a crime from the criminal. Every crime
is a cost imposing activity. It is a transaction in
which the criminal derives some satisfaction while
imposing initially uncompensated (external) costs
upon a set of victims which includes both the direct
victim of the crime and society in general. Just as
in every economic transaction the buyer must pay
the seller an acceptable price, the criminal should
pay, for purposes of efficient allocation, a price for
the satisfaction derived from the cost imposing
activity. This notion of a "price" for a crime is
manifested in the proportionality that governs
criminal sentencing. Generally, more serious crimes
result in harsher penalties to the offender. The
"seriousness" of a crime is actually a measure of
the total cost imposed by the crime. Clearly, a
peaceful society could not tolerate individual vic-
tims exacting the "price" from criminals, thus the
sentence imposed by the court forces payment to
society in general for the total cost of a crime.
The problem of crime and its control is, in
economic perspective, a special case of the larger
problem of allocating resources efficiently in the
presence of external effects. With typical cost im-
posing activities, the market mechanism effectively
regulates the activity. The activity will be required
to bear the costs for the resources it uses. These
costs will be calculated by those in the best position
to know them in determining how much activity
will be undertaken. In other words, the costs will
be internalized and an efficient allocation of
sources realized.
However, there are cost-imposing activities for
which there is no market for the primary resources.
Criminal activity is one such cost-imposing activity
in which the market mechanism does not operate
to internalize the costs. As a result, the victims of
the activity remain the cost bearers. Since the
number of cost bearers may be great and since
each may bear a different cost, the practical diffi-
culties involved in organizing these transactions
are likely to be insuperable. Thus, the costs of the
criminal activity remain uncompensated and ex-
ternal to the market mechanism.
Concern with systemic efficiency leads one to ask
how an efficient level of aggregate cost imposition
can be achieved in cases where the market solution
is unavailable. Alternative organizational modes
which centralize allocational decisions are inferior
to markets in their ability to allocate efficiently
because they are less able to extract the requisite
cost information in useful and timely forms.9 But
where markets fail and the goal of efficient alloca-
tion remains, nonmarket solutions must be sought
and careful consideration given to the relative ca-
pacity of these alternative institutional forms to
gather and use the information necessary for cen-
tralized allocational decisions.
Since the pathbreaking work of Gary Becker,'
0
economic analysis of the criminal process has
largely drawn upon this theoretical framework and
postulated a systemic objective of efficient resource
allocation. Following Becker, several writers" have
emphasized the formal specification of efficient
"marginal conditions," i.e., specific penalties to be
levied against individual offenders, which would
fully internalize the costs imposed upon others by
their crimes. Were the information necessary to fix
these penalties actually available, their application
would result in an efficient allocation of resources
to criminal activity and its control given the un-
derlying distribution of income and preferences.
However, this inquiry into systemic efficiency
has diverted attention from issues which areessen-
tial to a positive understanding of the criminal
process as it exists in the real world. The question
arises as to whether there are actual or realizable
institutional structures which can implement these
marginal conditions in practice. Can an. institution
extract information sufficient to define the relevant
prices necessary to organize the myriad of trans-
actions into an efficient system? If these extant
structures do exist, how have these structures them-
selves come to be organized and why?
This analysis specifically addresses the issue of
institutional form and organization in the criminal
process. In this as in other externality situations,
the central problem in the search for institutional
mechanisms to facilitate efficient allocation is the
'See Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 45 AM.
ECON. REv. 519 (1945).
" See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Ap-
proach, 76J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
"See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW
(1972); G. TULLOcK, THE Locic OF THE LAw (1971);
Diamond & Mirrlees, On the Assignment of Liability: The
Uniform Case, 6 BELL J. ECON. 487 (1975); Harris, On the
Economics of Law and Order, 78 J. POL. ECON. 165 (1970);
Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Law, 78 J. POL. ECON.
526 (1970). For an application of this analysis to tort
liability, see G. CALABREst, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMic ANALYSIS (1970).
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acquisition and dissemination of necessary infor-
mation.' 2 Markets in externalities fail because the
information required to permit efficient transac-
tions, the magnitude of personal costs and benefits
resulting from various externality relationships,
and the identities of those involved, generally im-
pacts upon individuals who have no opportunity
or incentive to reveal the extent of the external
effects upon them. But systems of criminal justice
(as well as systems of tort liability) can be seen as
imperfect but operational market-like structures
which encompass mechanisms to extract this infor-
mation in a form that will allow the identification
and completion of efficient transactions on a case-
by-case basis. Our concerns here are the properties
of these institutional structures and the variations
in form that result from differences in the nature
of the external effects which give rise to them. The
specifics of organization in the legal process, this
article argues, can be directly related to the human
characteristics and capacities of individual deci-
sionmakers and the problems they face in acquiring
necessary information in various exchange environ-
ments.
13
The institutional approach thus entails a basic
shift in emphasis from the factors that generate an
efficient system to the act of exchange itself and
the environment in which it takes place, an envi-
ronment often characterized by imperfection or
unavailability of essential information. Where in-
formation is difficult or impossible for individuals
-to obtain, markets and other institutional forms
can be seen as alternative modes of organizing
r, See, e.g., Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity:
Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket Allo-
cation, in PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS
(1970); Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities,
62 AM. ECON. REv. 307 (1972). A more general statement
of this problem is found in K. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF
ORGANIZATION 9-43 (1974).
"' In this respect, the present analysis owes much to
the "organizational failures framework" set forth in 0.
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). In general, this approach
to cconomic organization is primarily concerned with
situations where, because of the characteristics of the
individual parties to a given transaction or imperfections
in the structure of the particular market involved, trans-
actions that may otherwise result in benefits to the poten-
tial traders fail to be consummated. This combination of
human and environmental factors is viewed as a source
of cost or friction in the conduct of exchange in markets
and motivates the perception of many kinds of organi-
zations and social institutions as alternative mechanisms
that evolve in response to these costs and permit the
completion of mutually beneficial transactions where
markets fail to do so.
these exchanges. The informational problems that
confront human transactors become the key to
understanding the legal institutions which have
evolved in response to them. A developmental
perspective emerges; the evolution of observed legal
institutions can be rationalized in terms of their
relative efficacy in facilitating individually efficient
criminal transactions given the practical obstacles
to market organization.
Section I sets forth cognate models of the exter-
nal costs imposed by tortious and criminal activi-
ties as a demonstration that markets will generally
fail to define punishment prices sufficient to permit
the completion of efficient transactions. This leads
to an examination of the way in which American
legal institutions have evolved in both civil and
criminal contexts to fulfill this role. Section II
interprets the recent death penalty cases as an
attempt to ameliorate informational problems and
to facilitate a sentencing procedure that will en-
courage efficient crimes. Section III concludes with
a brief discussion of the positive and normative
aspects of these issues and the role of the criminal
process in a larger social context.
I. THE ORGANIZATION OF EXCHANGE IN CRIMINAL
TRANSACTIONS
A. INFORMATIONAL PROBLEMS IN MARKETS FOR
CRIMES AND TORTS
The basic economic theory outlined in the intro-
duction suggests that criminal sentencing in the
Anglo-American criminal process is an attempt to
measure the damages caused by an offender's un-
.lawful activity and to impose the cost of these
damages upon the offender in the form of a "pun-
ishment price." To analyze the transaction that
results in a criminal sentence, it is necessary first to
expose the precise nature of the "price" of a crime.
Although the abstract nature of the crime itself is
the primary basis for a determination of its cost,
the law has recognized two other elements. First, a
criminal act harms indirect victims who are not
involved in the actual criminal transaction. And
second, a precise calculation of the cost of a crime
depends upon the particular circumstances in
which it occurs.
1 4
14 Pollock and Maitland trace the English practice to
the time before the line separating crime from tort had
been sharply drawn:
A deed of homicide is thus a deed that can be
paid for by money. Outlawry and blood-feud alike
have been retiring before a system of pecuniary
compositions.... From the very beginning.., some
small offenses could be paid for; they were "emend-
19791
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Each criminal act produces a set of external
effects with two distinct kinds of cost, economic
and moral. These costs are imposed on two classes
of victims, direct and indirect. Economic costs
reflect personal welfare losses and are consequently
easily envisioned in material terms. Economic costs
are generally borne by the direct victims of an
offense and can often be the subject of a tort action.
The lost income and medical expenses suffered by
the victim of an assault are examples of direct
economic cost. But economic costs are also imposed
on indirect victims who are members of the com-
munity. This cost is reflected in the decrease in
material security and the decrease in incentives for
acceptable modes of behavior. For example, a bank
robbery not only harms the bank robbed, it may
also result in increased insurance rates for other
banks and may even stimulate other robberies.
Moral costs are the product of the community's
reaction to a crime based upon each individual's
sense of right and wrong. Moral costs are measured
in terms of the personal indignation or sense of
injustice one experiences as the result of the plight
of the victim of a crime. They are a positive attempt
to measure the social outrage that results from
many crimes and which is largely borne by the
indirect victims of crime. Moral costs need not be
manifested in changes of behavior on the part of
their bearers (and thus need not appear as changes
in market values), nor do we imply any ethical
justification for them in particular cases.
This characterization of social cost as a combi-
nation of economic and moral costs preserves the
institutional interpretation of the criminal process
as a means of externality control. Cost-imposing
activity is controlled through the exaction from an
offender of a "price" in the form of a deprivation
of liberty or a pecuniary fine, which corresponds
roughly to the total social cost of the offense.'
5
able." The offender could buy back the peace that
he had broken. To do this he had to settle not only
with the injured person but also with the king .... A
complicated tariff was elaborated. Every kind of
blow or wound given to every kind of person had its
price, and much of the jurisprudence of the time
must have consisted of a knowledge of these preap-
pointed prices.
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 451 (2d ed. 1968).
15 Price exaction of this kind will ideally lead to an
"efficient" level of criminal offenses in that only those
offenses in which the net benefit of the offender exceeds
the sum of economic and moral costs imposed by the act
will be encouraged. Where the certainty of conviction in
Thus, for example, severe penalties for crimes of
terror can be understood in terms of the clearly
substantial direct and indirect moral cost in-
volved. 16 Moreover, the apparent disparity in social
cost imposed for otherwise identical statutory of-
fenses can be traced to variations in moral cost.
This is because the outrage created by a given act
is sensitive to the identity and social status of both
the victim and offender and the peculiar circum-
stances under which the crime was committed. For
example, a presidential assassin will probably pro-
voke a greater quantum of social outrage than most
murderers, but a child who commits murder may
benefit from a sense of sympathy which mitigates
the moral costs of his act. This results in the
individualization of criminal sentencing, a princi-
ple which permeates the American criminal process
and is one of its most distinctive features."7
This characterization of social cost suggests a
useful positive distinction between crimes and torts.
Tortious activity rarely results in moral costs apart
from those which themselves generate separate
causes of action. Although moral costs do arise in
each case is less than perfect, Becker has shown that the
punishment price which minimizes the sum of the costs
imposed by the offense itself and the costs of maintaining
a mechanism of price exaction (and thus would lead to
systemic efficiency in the allocation of resources to crime
and its control) must exceed the actual social cost of the
act itself; the scale factor is the reciprocal of the proba-
bility of conviction. Se. Becker, note 10 supra. As D.
NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WrrHoUT TRIAL (1966) and R. DAWSON, SEN-
TENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CON-
DITIONS OF SENTENCE (1969) make clear, however, this
factor is generally not considered in the actual establish-
ment of punishment prices in practice. Despite the low
probability of conviction which characterizes many
American jurisdictions, sentencing authorities continue
to seek the punishment which most accurately reflects
the true social cost of each offense without regard to this
probability. This practice supports the positive portrayal
of the criminal process as a means to facilitate exchange
between cost imposers and cost bearers on a case-by-case
basis rather than as a mechanism designed to achieve
systemic efficiency of resource allocation.
16 Similarly, the graduated penalties generally associ-
ated with larcency, simple theft, robbery (which adds the
element of placing the direct victim in fear for his or her
safety), and armed robbery (in which this fear is intensi-
fied by the use of a weapon), can be rationalized in these
terms. In addition, "victimless" crimes, such as prostitu-
tion or consensual homosexuality, can be seen as lacking
only direct victims; there, all the external cost imposed
appears to be moral in nature and borne by indirect cost
bearers.
17 See generally DAWSON, note 15 supra; NEWMAN, note
15 supra.
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actions involving direct psychic injury i.e., pain
and suffering, most of the external effects of torts
are exclusively economic in nature. Thus, while
criminal activity imposes substantial moral costs
on a large number of victims, tortious activity
imposes a more clearly economic cost that is con-
centrated on a small and readily identifiable group
of cost bearers.'8 This points out one of the central
problems facing an institution attempting to reg-
ulate criminal transactions: each criminal trans-
action affects a large number of people in a highly
subjective manner.
In a model of the criminal justice system based
upon notions of efficient exchange, one must first
determine the factors that generate the cost of a
crime and, hence, the price subsequently due from
the offender. The classification of these factors into
economic and moral costs clarifies the nature of
the costs imposed by criminal acts. But if a crime
is to be viewed as a transaction one must define a
conceptual object of exchange. In other words, it is
necessary to clarify the nature of what a criminal
is "purchasing". In economic terms, this object of
exchange is an entitlement. According to Calabresi
and Melamed,'9 an entitlement is defined as a
collectively granted right either to impose costs in
a given way, or alternatively, to be free of costs
imposed by the acts of others. When the legislature
declares an act unlawful, it is in effect placing an
entitlement with the victim. For example, a bank
has an entitlement not to be robbed, and, for
purposes of efficiency, this entitlement should only
be exchanged if the purchaser (the criminal) is
willing to pay a "price" greater than the value of
the entitlement to the bank.
Entitlements can be protected by either "prop-
erty rule" or. "liability rule". The property rule
permits the transfer of entitlements whenever a
buyer and a seller can negotiate a mutually ac-
ceptable price, whereas under a liability rule, an
entitlement can be transferred whenever an indi-
"' An interesting intermediate case is the civil adjudi-
cation which involves punitive or exemplary damages,
for the moral element which motivates the punitive
measures endows such civil wrongs with many of the
attributes of crimes. Such damages are relatively rare,
however, precisely because they blur the distinction be-
tween tort and crime and require the jury to assess their
magnitude without formal guidance or the procedual
safeguards afforded the defendant by the criminal proc-
ess. See generally W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTs 1076-85 (5th ed. 1971).
0 Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L.
REV. 1089 (1972).
vidual is willing to pay an objectively determined
value for it.
In practice, two factors determine which rule
must be used: the degree of homogeneity in the
entitlements and the voluntariness of the transac-
tion. A homogeneous entitlement protects a "good"
that is identical for all buyers and sellers in the
relevant market since its value is not a function of
the individual transactors. In situations involving
entitlements that protect homogeneous goods for
which two parties can voluntarily negotiate an
acceptable price, market organization based on the
property rule can generate efficient transactions.
An example of this would be a typical fruit and
vegetable market where a transaction takes place
whenever two parties can negotiate a mutually
acceptable price.
If the goods sold are not homogeneous, a market
place based on the property rule can still function,
although at a less efficient level. An example of this
would be an antique market where the goods in-
volved are often unique and where both buyers
and sellers are often misinformed about the value
of an item. The decrease in efficiency is a result of
the difficulties involved in acquiring information
regarding the price and quality of the good being
traded.
There are certain transactions that take place
where voluntary negotiations over price are impos-
sible. An involuntary transaction is one in which
the two parties could determine an acceptable price
prior to a transaction which may or may not
actually take place in the future, but at the moment
of exchange, negotiations are impossible. For ex-
ample, many workers will accept a priori high risk
employment for increased wages. Yet at the mo-
ment a worker is to be "injured," it would be
impossible to negotiate a price that would induce
a worker to volunteer to be injured. But prior to
the event, the worker has, in essence, accepted a
price which accounts for the risk of injury he faces
on the job. Should the injury in fact occur, no
further compensation is due; the injuries borne by
the worker simply represent the results of a "losing
play" in a lottery in which he had voluntarily
participated.
If the entitlement is fairly homogeneous, a prop-
erty rule system can effectively regulate even in-
voluntary transactions. A good example of this is
the sale of certain medical supplies where, for
example,just prior to a critical operation, a patient
would pay an exorbitant price for a medicine
necessary to save his life. But evolved market ar-
19791
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rangements, usually involving insurance compa-
nies, generally force prices for such goods to an
efficient level by providing for price negotiations
prior to the actual moment at which the transac-
tion is completed.
The necessity for the liability rule arises where
an involuntary transaction involves nonhomoge-
neous goods. Where the transaction involved ho-
mogeneous goods, the use of a property rule was
facilitated in an involuntary situation by negoti-
ating a price prior to the actual transaction itself.
But since the value of nonhomogeneous goods var-
ies with the individual transactors, it is impossible
to negotiate an efficient price prior to the transac-
tion. If entitlements are to be transferred efficiently,
an "objective" price which accounts for the full
value of the entitlement to its original holder must
be set prior to the transaction.
The principal problem facing any institutional
arrangement seeking to facilitate efficient transac-
tions in external effects (cost-imposing activity) is
the acquisition and dispersion of information on
the cost of entitlements. Potential offenders must
have sufficient cost information prior to the com-
mision of a crime if they are to distinguish efficient
from inefficient cost imposition. In the usual mar-
ket situation, entitlements are placed with private
individuals and protected by property rule. Under
competitive conditions, the advantages of a decen-
tralized price system as a means of extracting this
cost information are well known.2° A system of free
negotiation will, in the absence of high transaction
costs, generally produce an efficient allocation of
tradable resources. Thus, in a typical market place,
normal market pressures will ensure the establish-
ment of efficient prices and the promotion of effi-
cient transactions.
The individualized nature of the cost imposed
by crimes and torts, and the resulting nonhomo-
geneity of the entitlements involved, generally pre-
cludes this result. Since the costs vary with the
particulars of the offense, a "small numbers" prob-
lem is created; every exchange is a unique trans-
action (bilateral monopoly) in which the absence
of equilibrating market forces provides an oppor-
tunity for all parties to conceal their preferences in
bargaining. "2' For example, competitive pressures
will force the orange salesman to reveal his costs
accurately and honestly, for if he does not, another
" See Hayek, note 9 supra.
21 WILLIAMSON, note 13 supra, identifies this combina-
tion of small numbers and opportunistic behavior by
potential traders as a core source of market failure.
producer dealing in identical oranges can undersell
him by revealing these values honestly. But the
victims and perpetrators of crime have little incen-
tive to reveal the true extent of the harm or the
satisfaction that has been produced. The nonhom-
ogeneity of these entitlements eliminates the prob-
ability that competitive forces will extract this
information. Moreover, the large number of dis-
persed moral cost bearers suggests high coordina-
tion and information gathering costs even where
preferences are truthfully revealed.22
A crime is thus an involuntary transaction in-
volving nonhomogeneous goods. Society attempts
to encourage the commission of only efficient
crimes by fixing penalties equal to, but no greater
than, the costs imposed by individual offenses. But
at the moment a criminal transaction is about to
take place, an individual would not voluntarily
accept the receipt of a price to permit the transfer
of the criminal entitlement. To permit the efficient
transfer of criminal entitlements, a price must be
set before the transaction is to take place.
The failure of markets to extract this cost infor-
mation in both criminal and tortious situations
requires the development of alternative institu-
tional structures. These institutions must evaluate
the costs imposed by various activities and thus
specify accurate punishment prices prior to the
actual transaction itself. In other words, if the
system encourages only the efficient transfer of
criminal and civil erititlements, potential offenders
must have accurate information on the price they
will have to pay. This objectification of costs in the
involuntary exchange of entitlements necessitates
a change from property rule to liability rule.
However, this objectification introduces an in-
evitable probability of error. Moreover, the widely
dispersed moral costs of crime pose informational
problems not encountered in the civil setting. The
qualitative distinction between criminal and tor-
tious activity motivates striking variations in the
organizational form of the Anglo-American legal
process. On the civil side, entitlements are privately
placed, and individual cost bearers retain the right
to be compensated directly by offenders for those
costs they can objectively demonstrate in court. An
example of this is the common tort case in which
a plaintiff can recover as damages compensation
for all physical and psychic injury. The economic
character of the costs involved and their relatively
narrow incidence enable the civil process to rely
22 These points are discussed further in Adelstein, supra
note 8, at 793-95.
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upon this arrangement as a means of generating
dependable information on the costs imposed by
tortious activity. Cost specification is facilitated by
the availability of market values for damaged
goods; the small number of direct victims ensures
that the full extent of the cost imposed can be
ascertained with a minimum of litigation. Where
all the costs of the offender's activity can be ac-
counted for in this way, the achievement of an
efficient level of cost imposition is impeded only by
the costs inherent in organizing the cause of action
and bringing the suit.23
In general, the victims of crime do not have a
right to direct compensation from the cost impos-
ers.2' Instead, criminal entitlements are publicly
placed, with the state rather than individual cost
bearers as the recipient of the punishment price.
Insofar as the cost information required to establish
efficient punishment prices impacts upon the vic-
tims of crime, it might at first seem natural to place
entitlements directly with the victims. This might
provide the victim with an incentive to reveal the
extent of the injury, thus providing the system with
accurate cost information. But the multiplicity of
moral cost bearers created by crimes makes this an
unsatisfactory solution to informational problems
in the criminal'context. While the aggregate moral
cost of a given offense may be substantial, the
number of such cost bearers is generally very large
and the individual cost borne by each relatively
small. As a result, for most victims, the cost of
participating directly in the legal process by bring-
ing suit to vindicate these moral entitlements
would exceed the benefit to be realized as compen-
sation from offenders ss
As a result of this problem, compensation can
more reliably be achieved by the state's provision
of a single-public good available to all, the con-
sumption of which would provide moral benefits
23 Certainly the costs associated with the price exaction
procedure itself and the institutional rules which require
one party or the other to bear them are important
determinants of whether or not the costs imposed by a
given act will in fact be internalized. The implications of
the American rules regarding these costs in criminal
litigation are discussed in Adelstein, note 8 supra.
" Insofar as particular offenses are defined as torts as
well as crimes, some direct costs imposed by offenders
may in fact be compensable. But such claims must be
pursued separately from criminal proceedings in the case,
and the costs involved in such actions make them a
practical rarity. Moreover, moral costs are in general not
compensable in civil actions.
' Analogous problems are faced in civil class action
suits.
generally sufficient to compensate the individual
moral costs of the offense involved. Criminal pun-
ishment in the form of physical restraint or severe
limitation of personal liberty is precisely such a
public good. These punishments are highly visible;
the suffering imposed upon convicted offenders is
easily recognized by the community as universally
painful and the element of retribution it represents
is payment "in kind" for moral costs incurred.
Informational problems still remain, for the sen-
tencing authority must still tailor punishment
prices to its own perception of the moral and
economic costs involved. But this institutional
structure has fulfilled two essential needs. It simul-
taneously creates an operational mechanism for
the exchange of criminal entitlements and also
provides a measure of restitution at far less expense
than would be required if all moral cost bearers
were given enforceable entitlements.
26
B. INDIVIDUALIZED PRICING OF CRIMINAL
ENTITLEMENTS: THE AMERICAN MODEL
The legal process is faced with the task of orga-
nizing the efficient transfer of criminal entitle-
ments. This entails two distinct problems. First, the
initial entitlement must be placed to distinguish
legal from illegal activity and second, a precise
determination of the economic and moral costs
generated by a particular crime must be made so
an efficient punishment price can be established.
In the American legal system, a two-part institu-
tional structure has evolved to perform these two
tasks. The initial decisions on both the placement
of entitlements and their price are made by the
26 Note that this solution fails to deal with the often
large economic costs visited upon direct victims. The
perceived inequity associated with this failure has
prompted many jurisdictions to institute administrative
arrangements designed to ameliorate these costs. Gener-
ally, direct victims are given the opportunity to establish
the objective economic cost they have borne, and those
claims approved by a compensation board are then paid
by the state. In this way, the state acts as insurer of these
costs and, to the extent that this encourages potential
directf victims not to undertake those private precautions
to avoid the costs of crime which they would otherwise,
an elenent of "moral hazard" is created. An interesting
contrast is observed in the French criminal process, which
allows direct victims to become third parties in criminal
litigation itself at their own expense, entitled to introduce
evidence independently of the public prosecutor on the
issues" of both guilt and damages. Should the defendant
be convicted, he may face both a criminal punishment
and. an award of compensatory damages to the direct
victim. See Vouin, The Role of the Prosecutor in French
Criminal Trials, 18 AM. J. CoMP. L. 483 (1970).
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legislature. This occurs every time a law is passed
proscribing a particular act and establishing a
punishment for its commission. But the legislative
judgment requires an assessment of a complex
situation based upon an ex ante evaluation of the
external effects of a crime. Since every crime is
unique, this ex ante judgment is prone to error and
usually lacking in specificity. The role of the judi-
cial process is to ameliorate these problems. Given
an initial legislative decision, the judiciary can
modify both the initial placement of entitlements
and the determination of cost.
For cost-imposing activity deemed illegal, the
entitlements are placed in the state, which can
exact a punishment price from violators. In con-
trast, for lawful activity, entitlements are placed in
the cost imposers, forcing those who suffer the cost
to bear the costs or remove the burden by pur-
chasing the entitlement. The determination that
an activity is a crime is a decision that in the
majority of cases a particular transaction results in
a net social loss. As a result of the high transaction
costs, it is most efficient to place the entitlement in
the victim.
The determination of transaction costs and the
determination of social gain or loss is the same for
civil and criminal entitlements. An examination of
the process in the civil context will facilitate an
understanding of how it operates in the criminal
context.
Hypothesize two adjoining landowners, Hamil-
ton and Jefferson. Hamilton has discovered that
his land is uniquely suited for opening a-business
of catering noisy parties. As a result of this discov-
ery, Hamilton's land has risen in value, but Jeffer-
son's land is now worth less. Suppose, for example,
that prior to opening the catering business, the
value of Hamilton's land to him was $1,000 while
Jefferson values his land at $1,200. Without the
catering business, the total value of the properties
is $2,200. If the catering business produces only a
$200 gain for Hamilton while causing a $500 loss
to Jefferson, the result of opening the business
would be a net social loss of $300 since the total
values of the properties now would be $1,900. If
Hamilton is given the entitlement, Jefferson will
pay him at least $200, but less than $500, to
prevent him from opening the business. IfJefferson
is given the entitlement, Hamilton will be unable
to bid a transfer price sufficient to persuade Jeffer-
son to sell the entitlement since the cost of the
business exceeds its benefits.
The efficient result is "no business," and assum-
ing negotiations between Hamilton and Jefferson
are cost free it is reached regardless of the initial
placement of the entitlement.27 However, if the
entitlement is placed with Jefferson, to whom it is
worth more, no transaction took place. Thus for
situations involving a net social loss, a transaction
is unnecessary, and transaction costs are obviated
if the entitlement is placed with the cost bearer.
The legislature undergoes the same process when
determining whether an activity should be crimin-
alized. Since there is a presumption that the vast
majority of victims place a higher total value on
their entitlement, a crime results in a net social
loss. Therefore, the cost efficient solution is to place
the entitlements with the cost bearers, i.e., the
victims, since this limits the number of transactions
and any attendant costs. In principle, then, only in
the rare case where a criminal places a higher value
on the entitlement than does the entire set of
victims, direct and indirect, will a transaction take
place.
The legislature's role in the assignment of enti-
tlements is to determine whether there is a pre-
sumption of net social gain or loss. But thejudiciary
also plays a role in the placement of entitlements.
The presumption of illegality in cases of net social
cost may be overcome by costs involved in the
process of price exaction itself (the cost of punishing
criminals). The identification, apprehension, con-
viction, and punishment of offenders clearly entails
substantial economic cost and moral costs may
result as well whenever price exaction procedures
are perceived by the citizenry as "unfair" or "im-
proper." These moral costs are incurred, for in-
stance, when rights of a defendant embodied in the
Constitution or widely shared communal values
are endangered or when inadequate safeguards
exist to protect against false arrest or conviction.
Where the sum of these costs exceeds the net social
cost of the activity, efficiency requires either that
the activity be made legal or that laws against it
be left unenforced, a decision often made by the
actors within the judicial process itself ex post.
Examples of this phenomenon are seen in the
sporadic enforcement of traffic laws, petty misde-
meanors, and marijuana laws.
The second task imposed on the criminal justice
system is to determine the price of these entitle-
ments. In a penal system where punishment is
equated with the costs imposed by a criminal act,
the price of entitlements will vary greatly in differ-
ent situations. The information required to price
27 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1
(1960).
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entitlements ex ante is thus beyond the legislature's
reach. The American response has been to divide
the information gathering burden betweer the leg-
islature and the courts. The legislature prosciibes
broadly defined offenses and establishes the outer
limits of punishment. The judiciary has the case-
by-case duty to specify the costs and penalties ex
post, and thus individualize the application of crim-
inal sanctions in the least cdstly way. The judiciary
must consider such factors as budgetary constraints
on its officers and the moral costs of various pro-
cedures in developing factfinding processes.and of
modes of conviction, such as plea bargaining,
which elicit the requisite information at a relatively
low cost.28
The key to the implementation of this mandate
is the pervasive discretion vested in judicial officers
to modify legislative standards where they believe
circumstances warrant. Police officers can focus
their efforts on certain types of activities to the
exclusion of others or enforce the law selectively
within offense categories. Prosecutors can frame
charges as they see fit or elect not to pursue a given
case at all." At trial, the jury may refuse to convict
even where the facts show a clear violation of the
law and, ofcourse, the trial judge has wide latitude
in fixing sentence upon conviction. This discretion,
moreover, plays an important informational role in
legal dynamics, for judicial. action 'consistently at
variance with legislative standards is a clear signal
to legislators that their assessments of cost in var-
ious situations may be in error.30
II. OROANIZATION FAILURE AND INSTITUTIONAL
RESPONSE IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
A. INDIVIDUALIZED PRICING AND INFORMATIONAL
PARADOX
A principal purpose of the institutional struc-
tures discussed here is to enable the potential of-
fender to distinguish efficient from inefficient of-
2American organizational arrangements and incen-
tive structures in this regard are discussed in detail in
Adelstein, note 8 supra.
2Compare the "legality principle" of European sys-
tems, which compels the prosecution to pursue all cases
which come to its attention.
' Discretion may lead to error in cost estimation at
the judicial stage as well. Where the error is understate-
ment, concern over "leniency" in sentencing may be
voiced. A complicating factor, however, is the availability
of post-conviction penal facilities; where such facilities
are inadequate or overcrowded it may be impossible to
impose the appropriate punishment price upon many
offenders.
fenses prior to their commission. An efficient crime
is one in which the satisfaction derived by the
criminal exceeds the price he must pay. By equat-
ing punishment price with the costs imposed by
the crime, society discourages only inefficient trans-
fers of criminal entitlements and provides (ab-
stracting from the uncertainty of conviction) for an
efficient level of criminal activity in the aggregate.
But the highly individualized nature of these costs
has motivated a two-stage approach to price exac-
tion in which specific prices are defined precisely
by the judicial process only upon completion of the
offense involved. Implicit in such an approach,
however, is an apparent informational paradox, for
in closely tailoring punishments to the peculiar
ciicumstances of each offense so as to encourage
only efficient transfers, the courts simultaneously
reduce the flow of information requisite to these
decisions to the potential offenders who must make
them.
Consider a continuum of market structures de-
finea by the degree of homogeneity which charac-
terizes the good, here tortious or criminal entitle-
ments, being traded. At one extreme is the case of
perfect homogeneity; every act of a given type
committed by every offender imposes an identical
cost upon the community. In this case, entitlements
can be protected by the property rule and market
forces can be relied upon to establish a single
efficient equilibrium price for them. In this single
parameter (the price of a similar "product"), a
potential offender can .find all the information
needed to determine the efficiency of his contem-
plated act. Rational behavior on his part will
suffice to ensure that only efficient transfers are
undertaken. But as the costs imposed by a given
act are allowed to vary with the circumstances
surrounding it, problems of information impact-
edness cause the protection of entitlements to pass
from property rule to liability rule. The single price
established in the polar case gives way to a multi-
tude of efficient entitlement prices, one for each of
the different levels of cost associated with the act.
Moreover, this fragmentation of the exchange en-
vironment results in the quantum of price infor-
mation available to the offender being insufficient
to effect only the efficient transfer of efntitlements.
Decisions at the margin require potentiaroffenders
to have more information about their place in the
fragmented environment which has produced the
multiplicity of prices than is contained in the set of
prices themselves. They must know which of these
prices will be exacted from them should they com-
mit the act in question, and their ability to ascer-
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tain this extra bit of information diminishes as the
costs imposed by the act become more specific to
individual circumstances and the number of pos-
sible punishment prices associated with it increases.
The final result is that a potential criminal may be
precluded from committing an efficient crime
when it is impossible to determine the cost (the
potential sentence if caught).
In the case of tortious entitlements, the economic
nature of the costs imposed and the possibility of
ex ante market valuation mitigate this problem to
some degree. But the moral cost involved in crim-
inal activity exacerbates the difficulty, and in the
polar case of purely individual specific cost impo-
sition, even full knowledge of the possible range of
punishment prices fails to provide the potential
offender with sufficient a priori information for his
marginal decision. Thus, as the exchange environ-
ment changes along the continuum in this direc-
tion, the "organizational failure" of the legal proc-
ess becomes ever more pronounced and its institu-
tions less able to perform the function of encour-
aging only efficient transfers of entitlements.
B. MANDATORY SENTENCING
Two distinct organizational arrangements which
remove much of the sentencing discretion granted
judicial officers can be seen as institutional re-
sponses to this informational paradox, each best
suited to a different kind of exchange environment.
The first is legislative drafting of a schedule of
uniform, mandatory penalties for various offense
categories. This is a form of systematic planning
which sharply reduces the economic cost of fixing
punishment prices, but one that entails a substan-
tial risk of inaccurate cost specification. Given the
"infinite variety of cases and facets to each case"'"
it may be possible to produce an efficient market
place with a system of mandatory sentencing. A
uniform price that represented a weighted average
of the costs imposed by each offenders' activity
would be exacted from all violators of a particular
law.
3 2
" McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208 (1971).
* This has recently been explained in economic terms
by Diamond. Let xj be the number of offenses of type xalh
committed by individual j, so that & < 0 is marginal
cost to individual h #j ofj's activity in x and - is the
marginal deterrent effect upon j of increments in the
punishment price for x. While in general, an efficient
level of activity in x will result if punishment prices
are individualized across offenders such that pj =
But the problem of gathering information suffi-
cient for the ex ante specification of these uniform
punishment prices is a most formidable one. First,
legislators must be able to predict the economic
and moral cost which would be imposed by each
potential offender in a given offense category. In
contrast, the two-stage procedure requires only the
ex ante articulation of these costs in the single case
at bar. Further, the legislature must estimate the
marginal deterrent effect of increased punishment
upon every potential offender, information not
required at all for individualized sentencing.
Where this information is available to the legis-
lature, uniform penalty schedules and the general
withdrawal of discretion from judicial officers may
promote efficient levels of criminal activity at sub-
stantially less economic cost than the two-stage
approach. In practice, the exchange environments
for which this institutional structure is best suited
can be characterized in two ways. Initially, the
social cost, particularly the moral cost, imposed by
each offense within a given category must be
roughly equal and within the scope of ex ante
estimation. These costs must thus be relatively
insensitive to the peculiar circumstances of the
offense and the identities of the direct parties to it.
Secondly, criminal punishment must have a deter-
rent effect upon potential offenders which is
roughly equal for every individual within easily
defined classes of offenders. Generally, both these
criteria seem more" accurately to describe crimes
against property, such as larceny and burglary,
and "white collar" crimes, embezzlement or fraud,
as opposed to crimes against the person, such as
assault, rape, or homicide. Offenders in these cases
are usually motivated by pecuniary gain and are
often "professional" criminals, more likely to weigh
the risks of crime rationally. Moreover, the individ-
ual characteristics of the criminals seem less likely
to be significant determinants of the moral cost
a lUh
-- , Diamond shows that efficiency in x can also be
achieved by exacting a uniform punishment price p*
from all offenders, where
_Eyy auh axj
j j,.j DXj -ap
Z ap
Thus, p* represents a weighted average of the costs
imposed by each offender's activity, the weights being
the deterrent effects upon each offender of increments in
p. Diamond, Consumption Externalities and Imperfect Corrective
Pricing, 4 BELLJ. ECON. 526 (1973).
[Vol. 70
THE PRICING OF CRIME
associated with their acts, perhaps justifying the
assumption of equal social cost for statutorily iden-
tical offenses.
But even in these cases, judicial officers often
strongly resist legislative attempts to limit their
charging and sentencing discretion in this way.
Where mandatory penalties are attached to crimes
of general definition, the judicial mechanism
adapts by an increase in plea bargaining as prose-
cutors reformulate charges against specific defend-
ants to avoid the systemic sentencing mandates.'.
Even greater difficulties would be presented by
attempting to treat crimes against the person, par-
ticularly violent crimes, within a mandatory sen-
tencing scheme. These crimes are often the product
of passion and circumstance and vary greatly from
case to case, elements which appear to require
individualized treatment at the judicial stage.
C. SENTENCING STANDARDS AND THE DEATH
PENALTY
An alternate and more typical response to the
informational paradox is legislative establishment
of clearly defined sentencing standards to be ap-
plied ex post by the judicial process in individual
cases. This addresses the informational paradox by
retaining a large amount of discretion in judicial
officers. In a series of recent decisions with impor-
tant ramifications for all criminal sentencing, the
U.S. Supreme Court has invalidated mandatory
penalty schemes in capital sentencing cases. The
Court imposed certain standards upon the criminal
process to prevent a violation of the constitutional
guarantees against cruel and unusual punishments.
The degree to which these opinions reflect the
problems discussed herein is indeed striking.
In McGautha v. Califomiam petitioner was found
guilty of murder and, in a separate trial proceeding
to fix the penalty, sentenced to die in the gas
chamber by the same jury which had convicted
him. The purpose of the separate penalty proce-
dure was to provide the jury with as much infor-
mation relevant to the sentencing decision as pos-
sible. While the jury was to be apprised "of the
circumstances surrounding the crime, of the de-
fendant's background and history, and of any facts
in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty, '
California law left the fixing of the sentence to the
unguided discretion of the jury. Upon their return
of sentences of death for him and life imprisonment
33 See NEWMAN, supra note 15, at 53-56, 112-14.
34402 U.S. 183 (1971).
sCAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (1970).
for a codefendant convicted of the same offense,
McGautha argued on appeal that a purely discre-
tionary procedure which could produce such a
result was fundamentally lawless and deprived him
of life without due process in violation of the
fourteenth amefidment.s
In response to this claim, the Court, speaking
through Justice Harlan, reviewed a history of at-
tempts to impose capital sentencing standards
upon the American criminal process which closely
reflects our earlier discussion of the two-stage ap-
proach to the efficient pricing of criminal entitle-
ments. Legislative efforts to "identify before the
fact those homicides for which the slayer should
die,"'37 by incorporating specific penalties in stat-
utes defining degrees of homicide were often frus-
trated by the jury's exercise of the nullification
power, i.e., the refusal to convict a defendant of the
capital offense in cases where they believed the
death penalty inappropriate. Rather than try to
refine further the definition of capital homicides,
legislatures instead met the nullification problem
by explicitly granting juries the discretion to indi-
vidualize the 'capital sentencing procedure ex post.
A 1968 decision concerning the composition of
capital sentencing juries discussed this practice of
permitting an unguided jury, acting as a repository
of community standards, to individualize sen-
tences. The opinion appears to recognize the ad-
vantages of ex post individualized sentencing in the
subtle and shifting equation of punishment price
and costs imposed.
Juries] do little more-and must do nothing less-
than express the conscience of the community on
the ultimate question of life or death.... [O1ne of
the most important functions any jury can perform
in making such a selection is to maintain a link
between contemporary community values and the
penal system-a link without which the determi-
nation of punishment could hardly reflect "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the prog-
ress of a maturing society."
-1 In McGautha the Court also considered the claim
that capital sentencing without separate guilt and pen-
alty proceedings was a denial of due process. While
recognizing the tension inherent in unitary proceedings
between a defendant's natural desire to present evidence
in mitigation of a potential death sentence and the fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination, the
Court refused to find a constitutional basis for imposing
"bifurcated" trial procedures upon the states. See 402
U.S. at 210-17.
3
7 1d. at 197.
'38Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15
(1968). The inner quotation is from the opinion of Chief
Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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The McGautha Court was not unmoved by peti-
tioner's argument that while the granting of un-
checked sentencing discretion in capital cases had
once served the purpose of identifying the very rare
defendant whose life would be spared, in modern
times its function had become just the opposite, for
juries have become increasingly loath to impose
the death penalty in any but the most extraordi-
nary cases. But in failing to impose sentencing
standards in these circumstances, legislatures im-
plicitly created two groups of murderers, those who
should live and those who should die, without
offering any basis, rational or otherwise, for distin-
guishing one from the other. Whatever its original
purposes, the petitioner contended, such a sentenc-
ing mechanism had become constitutionally intol-
erable as a means of selecting the unlucky few
whose crimes deserve the ultimate sanction. In the
Court's view, however, the construction of an in-
telligible set of standards which would simultane-
ously provide these ex ante distinctions but maintain
and encourage individualized sentencing based
upon thejury's proper consideration of "the infinite
variety of cases and facets to each case"39 was quite
literally impossible,40 and the Court thus refused
to hold that the fourteenth amendment mandated
them.
In a long and scholarly dissent, Justice Brennan
found "sentencing procedures that are purposely
constructed to allow the maximum possible varia-
tion from one case to the next, and provide no
mechanism to prevent that consciously maximized
variation from reflecting merely random or arbi-
trary choice' 41 to be inconsistent with the rule of
law itself and thus with the dictates of due process.
The suggestion that standards must be so precise
and mechanical as to remove all discretion from
the sentencing authority was, he argued, a misap-
prehension. But the fourteenth amendment does
require that the state's choices regarding penal
policy be expressed clearly and be administered
through procedures which ensure substantial con-
sistency and avoid the "government by whim"42
forbidden by due process. Moreover, the primary
responsibility for articulating such policy must be
3 402 U.S. at 208.
' "To identify before the fact those characteristics of
criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for
the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in
language which can be fairly understood and applied by
the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are
beyond present human ability." Id. at 204.
4' Id. at 248.42 Id. at 250.
with the legislature, and while it may delegate its
authority to enact or enforce policy in specific cases
to administrative or judicial bodies, it must do so
subject to controls on discretion which prevent the
legislature from abdicating this basic decisionmak-
ing responsibility. Included among acceptable con-
trol mechanisms, he maintained, are sentencing
guidelines or standards which permit the clear
expression of legislative policy but do not require
the sentencing authority to be insensitive to unfor-
seen but important details. These guidelines would
be subject to judicial review to prevent inconsistent
application or to prevent the use of impermissible
factors such as race or religion in decisionmaking.
The constitutional vehicle for Justice Brennan's
analysis was the fourteenth amendment principle
that legislative enactments cannot be so vague as
to permit their arbitrary application to specific
individuals. His formulation of this doctrine can
be substantially illuminated in terms of the infor-
mational paradox posed by individualized sentenc-
ing. Traditionally, the vagueness doctrine has been
held to require that a criminal statute must at least
give citizens fair notice of the precise conduct
which it forbids;" that is, it must clearly define the
initial placement of criminal entitlements regard-
ing cost imposing behavior in various situations.
But, as it has been demonstrated, merely establish-
ing the initial ownership of a given entitlement
while leaving the specification of its individualized
transfer price (or indeed whether any price will
ultimately be attached to it) to the ex post operation
of the judicial process creates severe infotimational
problems for the potential offender seeking to effect
an efficient transaction.
Justice Brennan's view of the doctrine, based on
the Court's earlier holding in Giaccio v. Pennsylva-
nia," would speak to this further problem of notice
as well. In Giaccio, the Court overturned a Penn-
sylvania statute whereby the state attempted to
mitigate the harshness of its common-law rule re-
quiring criminal defendants to pay the costs of
prosecution in all cases by committing the matter
to thejury's discretion in cases where the defendant
was acquitted. Thus, as in McGautha, the statute
implicity created two classes of unlawful conduct,
one in which the criminal statute itself would apply
and a second in which the behavior of acquitted
defendants might still be deemed sufficiently re-
prehensible to justify the imposition of court costs.
Significantly, the Giaccio Court did not void the
4See, e.g., Lanzetta v. NewJersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
44 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
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statute because it permitted the punishment of
legally innocent defendants. Rather, it struck down
the act because "it is so vague and standardless
that it ... leaves judges and jurors free to decide,
without any legally fixed standards, what is pro-
hibited and what is not in each particular case."
4
In applying this view to the implicit classification
scheme represented by standardless capital sen-
tencing, Justice Brennan suggests that the legisla-
ture can constitutionally fragment the exchange
environment by providing differing punishment
prices in various circumstances. But if the legisla-
ture wishes to do this and continue to induce
efficient criminal transactions, it must provide po-
tential offenders some further information regard-
ing their place in the fragmented environment.
Articulated standards which preserve, subject to
judicial review, some measure of sentencing discre-
tion can, in his view, discharge this obligation.
The Court soon developed these themes in Fur-
man v. Georgia," a case in which it squarely con-
fronted the constitutionality of the death penalty
in the context of the eighth amendment prohibition
of "cruel and unusual punishments." The Court,
however, was unable to find five members willing
to speak in a single voice on this general issue, and
could muster only a bare majority in support of
the narrow per curiam holding that the imposition
and execution of death sentences in the specific
cases under consideration in Furman violated the
eighth amendment.47 Each of the nine Justices
contributed a lengthy opinion regarding the gen-
eral issue. Justices Brennan and Marshall each
argued that "evolving standards of decency"48 in
American life had rendered the death penalty cruel
and unusual punishment under any circumstances.
The remaining three opinions in the per curiam
majority, as well as Chief Justice Burger's dissent,
however, are of more interest to this discussion.
Justice Douglas, arguing that "the idea-of equal
protection of the laws... is implicit in the ban on
'cruel and unusual' punishments,' 9 read the Eng-
lish and American antecedents of the eighth
amendment to suggest that
it is "cruel and unusual" to apply the death pen-
alty-or any other penalty-selectively to minori-
ties whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of
45 Id. at 402-03.
40408 U.S. 238 (1972).
17 The separate petitions of three condemned black
men were heard in Furman.
See note 38 supra.
'9 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
society, and who are unpopular, but whom society
is willing to see suffer though it would not counte-
nance general application of the same penalty across
the board.'
Yet even ostensibly neutral capital sentencing
procedures in the United States which grant un-
guided discretion to sentencing authorities in prac-
tice have produced precisely this result, and the
burden of this discrimination has largely been
borne by the poor and the black.51 While conceding
that it is logically possible for such selective pro-
cedures to operate in a constitutionally neutral
way, Justice Douglas contended that history has
shown their application to be irreconcilable with
the "desire for equality ... reflected in the ban
against 'cruel and unusual punishments."' 5 2 Thus
the eighth amendment demands withdrawal of this
discretion to discriminate and its replacement by
clear, legislatively defined sentencing structures
overseen by the courts. As he explicitly recognized,
such an approach is foreclosed to a Court "im-
prisoned in the McGautha holding.' 'ss Therefore, he
would use the eighth amendment rationale to over-
turn McGautha and instead adopt the procedures
outlined in Justice Brennan's dissent, in which he
had joined.
While declining to interpret the eighth amend-
ment in this way, the two remaining members of
the Furman majority also based their concurrences
upon the nature of the discretionary process which
had produced these sentences. For Justice Stewart,
the constitutionality of the death penalty per se
would be at issue only if these cases were the result
of a sentencing procedure which made death man-
datory upon conviction for specifically defined of-
fenses. But its imposition under discretionary pro-
cedures which "capriciously [condemn a] random
handful" such that "if any basis can be discerned
for the selection of these few sentenced to die, it is
the constitutionally impermissible basis of race"'
54
was, in his view, cruel and unusual.
"' Id. at 245.
51 "But the Leopolds and Loebs, the Harry Thaws, the
Dr. Sheppards and the Dr. Finchs of our society are never
executed, only those in the lower strata, only those who
are members of an unpopular minority or poor and
despised." Id. at 248 n.10.
Id. at 255.
3 Id. at 248.
54 Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stew-
art uneasily distinguished McGautha by noting that the
case had been decided solely on due process grounds and
that the Court had explicitly refused in McGautha to
consider claims under the eighth amendment. Id. at 310
n.12. In dissent, Justice Powell responded that if the
19791
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To this, Justice White added a note which recalls
the Brennan dissent in McGautha. Where legisla-
tures have authorized the death penalty but left its
imposition to the standardless discretion of the
jury, he argued, legislative purpose will not be
frustrated even if the penalty is never imposed.
"Legislative 'policy' is thus necessarily defined not
by what is legislatively authorized but by what
juries and judges do in exercising [their discre-
tion]. In my judgment, what was done in these
cases violated the Eighth Amendment."'
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Burger spoke
directly to what he saw as the sub silentio overrul-
ing of the one-year-old and carefully considered
McGautha decision. Burger described jurors as refi-
ners of legislative intent with regard to sentencing
who are properly meticulous where the death pen-
alty is involved. Burger then challenged Justice
Douglas's assertion that capital juries had acted in
a racially or socially biased way in the past or that
they would do so in the future. Further, he argued,
eighth and fourteenth amendment principles ought
not to be inappositely mixed in this way. Where it
can be shown that prima facie constitutional dis-
cretionary sentencing procedures are being em-
ployed discriminatorily or irresponsibly, sufficient
doctrine regarding the equal protection clause ex-
ists to strike down these practices. To Justices
Stewart and White, concerned with the extremely
rare imposition of the death penalty in practice, he
responded dryly that their approach "suggests that
capital punishment can be made to satisfy Eighth
Amendment values if its rate of imposition is some-
how multiplied; it seemingly follows that the flex-
ible sentencing system... has yielded more mercy
than the Eighth Amendment can stand."' More
directly, he questioned the propriety and efficacy
of the remedies to the ill they had identified. As
McGautha had argued, sentencing standards of sub-
stance would be frustrated by the irrepressible
tendency of judicial officers to individualize the
criminal process; the prosecutor's charging discre-
tion and the jury's power to nullify or convict of a
lesser offense could not be denied.57 The alternative
to mandatory sentencing, while sharing this defect,
was even worse. Such arrangements, he main-
McGautha Court had been prepared to find the death
penalty unconstitutional on eighth amendment grounds,
its approval of standardless capital sentencing would
have been a "singularly academic exercise." Id. at 427
(Powell, J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 314 (White, J., concurring).
408 U.S. at 398 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
57See text at note 33 supra.
tained, would eliminate the element of mercy from
capital sentencing and thus could only be seen as
a backward step in penal practice.'
In the months immediately following the Furman
decision, thirty-five states adopted legislation au-
thorizing the imposition of the death penalty under
procedures which they believed would satisfy the
Court's reading of the eighth amendment. Five of
these statutes were tested simultaneously in a series
of decisions announced during the summer of
1976,59 and while the Court once again was unable
to gather a firm majority behind a single rationale
applicable to each of the five cases, the contours of
a clear and coherent constitutional position on the
issue of capital sentencing standards and the infor-
mational problems within the price exaction frame-
work which they addressed began to emerge. Leg-
islatures must meet "Furman's basic requirement"
of at least partially ameliorating the informational
paradox "by replacing arbitrary and wanton jury
discretion with objective standards to guide, regu-
larize, and make rationally reviewable the process
for imposing a sentence of death."0 At the same
time, however, the individualized application of
the criminal sanction must be preserved and man-
datory sentencing procedures which remove all ex
post sentencing discretion and do not "guide and
focus the jury's objective consideration of the par-
ticularized circumstances of the individual offense
and the individual offender before it can impose a
sentence of death ' 'Si will be struck down.
In Gregg v. Georgia,es petitioner challenged a bi-
furcated procedure under which sentences of death
had been imposed upon him for each of two counts
of murder and one of armed robbery. At the guilt
stage, Georgia law required the defendant to be
convicted of a lesser, noncapital offense if any view
of the evidence supported the charge reduction. If
this initial proceeding resulted in a verdict of guilty
to a capital charge, a separate penalty trial was
convened in which further evidence regarding the
presence of factors aggravating or mitigating the
The remaining dissenters, Justices Blackmun, Pow-
ell, and Rehnquist, each amplified upon these themes,
and further argued that, whatever their personal views
as to the propriety of the death penalty per se, such
determinations were more properly left in the legislative
domain.
9 See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
6o Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 303.
61 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 274.
62 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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offense could be placed by either side before the
sentencing judge or jury. While the sentencing
authority was free to consider any such circum-
stances not impermissible under law, it could not
return a death sentence unless it specifically found
the presence of at least one of ten aggravating
factors clearly defined in the Georgia statute. Fur-
thermore, it was not required to impose the death
penalty in any case. If it did so, however, the
statute granted the defendant specially expedited
direct review by the Georgia Supreme Court to
determine the appropriateness of the penalty. That
court was bound to overturn the sentence if it
found (1) that the sentence was "imposed under
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor";3 (2) insufficient evidence to sup-
port the finding of the statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances; or (3) the death sentence excessive
relative to penalties imposed in Georgia for like
offenses under similar circumstances.6
4
The United States Supreme Court, by a vote of
seven to two, upheld the constitutionality of this
closely circumscribed procedure. After first reject-
ing the claim that the death penalty per se consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment, Justice Stew-
art, in a plurality opinion joined by Justices Powell
and Stevens,6 characterized Furman as mandating
that discretionary capital sentencing' procedures
not create a substantial risk that the death penalty
will be imposed capriciously or arbitrarily. Toward
this end, "justice generally requires ... that there
be taken into account the circumstances of offense
together with the character and propensities of the
offender." 66 Bifurcated trial proceedings are more
likely to remove the deficiencies identified in Fur-
man because they use this information without
prejudicing the decision with respect to guilt.'
Moreover, once the sentencing authority has this
information, society can ensure that it will be used
as the basis of a fair and principled sentence if the
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(l) (Supp. 1975).
6 In Gregg's case, the Georgia Supreme Court used
this third ground to void the death sentence on the armed
robbery count.
' A concurring opinion by Justice White, joined by
Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, adopted a
substantially similar rationale, and Justice Blackmun
joined in the result, citing only his dissent in Furman.
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in Gregg, reas-
serting their belief that the death penalty perse violates
the eighth amendment.
" 428 U.S. at 189 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302
U.S. 51, 55 (1937)).
'7 See note 36 supra.
legislature offers the judiciary guidance as to those
factors most relevant to the sentencing decision.
In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that
the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary
or capricious manner can be met by a carefully
drafted statut6 that ensures that the sentencing
authority is given adequate information and guid-
ance. As a general proposition, these concerns are
best met by a system which provides for bifurcated
proceeding at which the sentencing authority is
apprised of the information relevant to the imposi-
tion of sentence and provided with standards to
guide its use of the information.rs
Thus McGautha, mortally wounded by Furman,
was dispatched by Justice Stewart's carefully cho-
sen words in Gregg.9
The petitioners argued that the retention of
prosecutorial discretion and the jury's power to
return a conviction of a lesser offense even where
a capital verdict could be supported produced an
intolerable potential for arbitrariness. The plural-
ity responded that removal of this discretion would
go far beyond the Furman requirement of principled
sentencing and that the complete inability of the
judicial process to tailor punishments to "the par-
ticularized circumstances of the crime and the
defendant" would produce a system "totally alien
to our notions of criminal justice."'7 Moreover,
citing the Georgia Supreme Court's action in
Gregg's own case, the plurality argued that the
statute's judicial review provision provided an ad-
equate check against capricious or disproportionate
sentences.
71
In Woodson v. North Carolina,72 the Court held that
a statute imposing a mandatory capital sentence
was impermissible since it did not allow indivi-
dualization of sentence. North Carolina had at-
tempted to satisfy Furman by replacing all sentenc-
ing discretion in cases of "willful, deliberate and
r 428 U.S. at 195.
69justice Stewart noted the demise of McGautha: "In
view of Furman, McGautha can be viewed rationally as a
precedent only for the proposition that standardless jury
sentencing procedures were not employed in the cases
there before the Court so as to violate the Due Process
Clause." Id. at 195-96 n.47. Under Furman and Gregg,
however, such procedures are generally in violation of the
eighth amendment.
70 428 U.S. at 199, 200 n.50.
71 Essentially similar variants of the Georgia procedure
were upheld in the companion cases, Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976) and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976).
72 428 U.S. 280 (1976). A similar procedure was struck
down in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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premeditated killing"73 with a mandatory penalty
of death. But Justice Stewart, again speaking for
himself and Justices Powell and Stevens, 74 argued
that this approach merely "papered over"7 5 the
problem of distinguishing ex ante those murderers
who must die from those who are to be spared.
Echoing Justice Harlan's majority opinion in
McGautha, he noted that such a procedure invites
jury nullification and the essentially ad hoc and
unprincipled sentencing results which accompany
it. Where "[tihe belief no longer prevails that every
offense in a like legal category calls for an identical
punishment without regard to the past life and
habits of a particular offender,"7 6 the eighth
amendment cannot tolerate a statute which "treats
all persons convicted of a designated offense not as
uniquely individual human beings, but as mem-
bers of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be sub-
jected to the blind infliction of the penalty of
death." 77
This completed the Court's reversal of McGautha,
and in adopting sentencing procedures identical to
those proposed by Justice Brennan's dissent in that
case, it substantially mitigated the effect of the
informational paradox posed by purely individu-
alized ex post sentencing.7 The specification of this
73 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
74 The plurality was joined this time by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, withJustices White, Blackmun, Rehn-
quist, and Chief Justice Burger dissenting. Thus, the
three-member plurality would distinguish standardized
and mandatory capital sentencing procedures on consti-
tutional grounds, while Justices Brennan and Marshall
would reject all forms of capital sentencing and the
Woodson dissenters would approve both post-Furnan ap-
proaches.
75 428 U.S. at 302.7 1Id. at 296-97 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
7 Id. at 304.
78The capital sentencing procedure established in
Gregg and Woodson was refined by the Court's subsequent
consideration of an Ohio death penalty statute in Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586(1978). While the statute complied
with Gregg's mandate that specific aggravating circum-
stances which would support a sentence of death be
clearly articulated, it sharply curtailed the sentencing
authority's discretion to show mercy by limiting the
consideration of mitigating factors to three specifically
stated in the statute. Where aggravating factors exist, the
statute permitted a sentence less than death only where
the defendant could show by a preponderance of evidence
that: (1) the victim of the offense induced or facilitated
it, or (2) it is unlikely that the offense would have been
committed but for the fact that the offender was under
duress, coercion, or strong provocation, or (3) the offense
was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or
paradox and its origins in the context of price
exaction, moreover, suggests a deeper understand-
ing of the way in which institutional structures
have evolved over time in the criminal process. The
precise mechanism of this evolution is certainly
complex and not yet fully understood, for the
specific institutional problems and alternatives
posed to appellate courts each result from the slow
accretion of many marginal and interrelated deci-
sions made by the various actors on the judicial
stage. But the analysis of these and other cases
within the price exaction framework'h points to a
clear role for appellate courts in this evolutionary
process. Where necessary, they appear to respond
to changing conditions in the exchange environ-
ment by identifying constantly shifting sources of
failure in the exchange mechanism, for example,
"evolving standards of decency" in the imposition
of penalties and an apparent historical trend to-
ward greater individualization in the perception of
costs emanating from criminal activity, and shap-
ing institutional structures to meet them. While
not necessarily "optimal" forms, these evolved
structures do permit the continued exchange of
enitlements within the criminal process.
II. SOME OBSERVATIONS IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS
The price exaction framework provides a natural
analytic context for the adaptive and evolutionary
mental deficiency though such condition is insufficient to
establish the defense ofinsanity.
A plurality of four Justices (Burger, Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens), however, speaking through Chief Justice
Burger, offered a solution quite consonant with the con-
cern for individualized sentencing expressed in Woodson.
Noting that "the concept of individualized sentencing in
criminal cases generally, although not constitutionally
required, has long been accepted in this country," Id. at
602, the plurality stressed the irrevocability of the death
sentence and concluded that, in general, sentencers in
capital cases must "not be precluded from considering as
a miligatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death." Id. at 604 (original emphasis). When the choice
is between life and death, theyargued, the risk of error is
too great to allow the Ohio procedure to stand.
It is worth noting that this portion of Chief Justice
Burger's opinion was prefaced by the observation that
the Court's recent holdings with respect to the death
penalty had generated much confusion, and that "[tlhe
signals from this Court have not ... always been easy to
decipher." Id. at 602. That these holdings can be usefully
rationalized in terms of the informational paradox is a
demonstration of the analytical power of the price exac-
tion model of the criminal process.
7 See generally Adelstein, note 8 supra.
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nature of certain types of constitutional adjudica-
tion within the criminal process. It also illuminates
an important set of positive and normative issues.
In a positive sense, the interpretation of the crimi-
nal process set forth here is an economics which
suggests that what judges have to tell economists is
more important than what economists have to tell
judges. Our analysis has shown that a clear eco-
nomic logic can be discerned in the form of impor-
tant institutional structures in the legal process.
These structures serve a set of evolutionary pur-
poses in a clearly defined system of economic ex-
change with analytically well specified types of
problems. Epistemologically, then, the constitu-
tional litigation discussed here and the institutional
structure resulting from it can be seen as "positive
evidence" in support of the price exaction model
of the criminal process in much the same way as
the existence of patent law structures as a response
to the public good aspects of invention and knowl-
edge creation can be seen as "positive evidence" in
support of the theory of public goods.80
In this light, it is interesting to consider more
closely the structure of the price exaction frame-
work itself. Implicit in the framework is the posited
existence of a set of entitlements which might be
seen as "intrinsic" in the sense that they logically
exist prior to the legal structures which evolved to
define them precisely and to protect them from
uncompensated encroachment. Moreover, the mo-
tivating force driving this evolutionary process is
not the systemic objective of efficient resource al-
location directly, but rather a postulated human
propensity to exchange these entitlements at the
margin and to organize structures to facilitate this
exchange in response to changing environmental
conditions.81 In this context, it seems natural to
perceive a variety of institutions and organizations,
so Argument of this kind is not limited to legal struc-
tures, as M. OLSON, THE LoGIC OF COLLECTIVE AcTtON:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) dem-
onstrates. A similar epistemological position characterizes
the inquiry of Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA
N.S. 386 (1937); Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.EcON. REv. 777
(1972); and WILLIAMSON, note 13 supra, into the nature of
business firms.
81 The existence of a propensity towards mutually
beneficial exchange at many levels of behavior is by no
means an idea of recent scholarly vintage. For example,
see A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 117 (A. Skinner
ed. 1970): "[The division of labor] is a necessary, though
very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propen-
sity in human nature.., the propensity to truck, barter,
and exchange one thing for another."
including many outside the traditional scope of
economic scholarship as well as those within it, as
evolved forms which attempt to facilitate individ-
ual exchange when human and environmental fac-
tors make this prohibitively costly. This vantage
point in turn suggests the potential of what might
be termed the "institutionalist" position. This po-
sition directs positive economic inquiry toward the
forces and frictions which promote and retard the
individual transaction. Insofar as much of the so-
cial fabric can be seen as woven to account not for
situations in which markets work perfectly but
rather for those in which they do not because
exchanges are blocked by substantial costs of con-
tracting, a great deal can be learned from the study
of human institutions as responses to various
sources of market failure.
From a normative perspective, it is of interest to
note that the ostensibly equitable nature of the
constitutional debate regarding the death penalty
can be understood in terms of this evolutionary
process. But while this facet of the analysis initially
might be seen as a rationale for systemic planning
in the criminal process and a means toward "ob-
jective" resolution of important normative prob-
lems, a moment's reflection reveals that it merely
clarifies the nature of these issues and serves to pose
them more directly. The central role of moral cost
in the definition of criminal offenses and the pun-
ishment prices associated with them, the interrela-
tionship of law and procedure to which it contrib-
utes, and the retributive aspects of a criminal
process organized around the principle of price
exaction underscore the need for caution in this
regard. It is a commonplace of equilibrium theory
that the particular terms of an efficient market
allocation and the prices which motivate it depend
not only upon individual tastes and preferences,
but also upon the distribution of resources which
precede the exchange as well. This interrelation-
ship means that any claim that a particular effi-
cient outcome is in some sense socially preferred or
"optimal" presupposes prior judgments about the
propriety of the underlying income distribution
and the legitimacy of satisfying only certain indi-
vidual preferences through the exchange mecha-
nism. This implies that distributional problems
must be articulated and resolved independently of
allocational issues. Insofar as class, income, social
status, religious conviction, and simple bigotry all
may be significant determinants of the moral cost
associated with given activities of specific individ-
uals, it is clear that every scheme of retributive
1 19791
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justice is built upon and reinforces a particular
scheme of distributive justice. Tyranny may well
come disguised as efficiency. The ethical issues of
the death penalty thus are not best posed by prob-
lems of criminal procedure, which have a clear
efficiency component, but rather by the definition
of the underlying law itself within the context of
price exaction. Where there is tyranny in the crim-
inal process, the remedy must be in the law itself
rather than in the procedures which implement it.
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